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Abstract—Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is a new class
of network architectures designed to address some key limitations
of the current IP-based Internet. One of its main features is in-
network content caching, which allows requests for content to be
served by routers. Despite improved bandwidth utilization and
lower latency for popular content retrieval, in-network content
caching offers producers no means of collecting information about
content that is requested and later served from network caches.
Such information is often needed for accounting purposes. In
this paper, we design some secure accounting schemes that vary
in the degree of consumer, router, and producer involvement.
Next, we identify and analyze performance and security tradeoffs,
and show that specific per-consumer accounting is impossible in
the presence of router caches and without application-specific
support. We then recommend accounting strategies that entail
a few simple requirements for CCN architectures. Finally, our
experimental results show that forms of native and secure CCN
accounting are both more viable and practical than application-
specific approaches with little modification to the existing archi-
tecture and protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
The original Internet was designed in the late 1970s with
the main purpose of providing end-to-end communication. It
allowed thousands of users to remotely access scarce com-
puting resources from terminals. Since then, the number of
Internet users has grown exponentially. They use a wide
variety of applications, many of which involve some form of
content distribution. This shift in usage exposed some design
limitations of the current IP-based Internet and motivated the
exploration of new networking architectures.
Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is an approach to inter-
networking exemplified by two well-known research efforts:
the CCNx project at the Palo Alto Research Center [1] and
Named-Data Networking (NDN) [2]. In IP-based networking,
a user requests content by addressing the host at which it
is stored. Conversely, in CCN, content is assigned a unique
name and is addressed directly. Any entity can become a
content producer as long as it can show that is authorized for
a certain part of the global content namespace. A user, called a
consumer, requests content by issuing an interest carrying the
former’s name. Such interests can be satisfied by any entity
(host or router) that either creates or caches the requested
content. The content follows, in reverse, the exact path of
the preceding interest towards the consumer. Any intervening
routers on this path may cache the content to satisfy future
interests for the same content.
These in-network caches facilitate efficient content distri-
bution. This important feature helps reduce end-to-end latency
and lower bandwidth consumption when requesting popular
content. Since an interest can be satisfied by a copy of the
requested content found in a router’s cache, it might not reach
the producer. Consequently, a producer might only receive a
small fraction of all interests for a given piece of content. At
the same time, the number, sources, and timing of interests
represent important information that could be used for ac-
counting by the producer. Even if the timing and the number of
interests were somehow communicated to the producer, interest
sources would remain unknown since CCN lacks consumer
information, e.g., source addresses, in interests.
Furthermore, router cache space will likely be treated as a
valuable (and even premium) resource as CCN is deployed in
the real world. Thus, a mechanism is needed for reporting
cache hits to content producers or router owners, thereby
informing them about content usage. To be viable, such a
mechanism must only incur minimal bandwidth, computation,
and storage overheads. Finally, to prevent attacks such as false
cache usage reporting, it also must be be secure. In this paper,
we design a lightweight secure accounting mechanism, appli-
cable, to both CCNx and NDN1. Our intended contributions
are three-fold:
• Identification and motivation for features needed for CCN
accounting and for security thereof.
• The first comprehensive technique for content and cache
usage accounting, with varying levels of consumer, router,
and producer involvement.
• Analysis of performance and security tradeoffs.
In the rest of this paper, we use the term CCN to refer to both
CCNx and NDN.
Organization. Section II overviews CCN. Next, Section III
discusses desired features for content accounting. Security
requirements are addressed in Section IV. Performance of
the proposed approach is assessed in Section VI. The paper
concludes with a summary of related work in Section VII.
II. CCN OVERVIEW
This section gives an overview of CCN. Given familiarity
with CCN, it can be skipped without loss of continuity. Note
that all details are presented in the context of the CCNx
architecture and protocol. Specifics such as packet formats,
message fields, and routing decisions have subtle differences
in NDN. However, with minor changes to the protocol and
packet formats, our description also applies to NDN.
1Support for NDN requires minor packet format and protocol changes.
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Unlike IP which focuses on end-points of communica-
tion and their names/addresses, CCN stresses content by
making it named, addressable, and routable [1]. A content
name is represented with a labeled content identifier (LCI)
string, which is similar to a standard URI. For example, a
BBC news home-page for April 15, 2015 might be named
lci:/uk/bbc/news/2015APR15/index.htm.
CCN communication follows the pull model whereby
content is delivered to consumers only upon explicit request.
There are two basic types of packets (messages) in CCN:
interest and content object messages2. A consumer requests
content by issuing an interest message. If an entity can
“satisfy” a given interest, it returns the corresponding content
object. Name matching in CCN is exact, i.e., an interest for
lci:/snapchat/Bob/video-749.avi can only be satisfied by
a content object named lci:/snapchat/Bob/video-749.avi.
CCN interest messages include, at a minimum, the name
of the requested content. They may also carry a payload that
enables consumers to push data to producers along with the
content request [3].3 CCN content objects include a number
of fields. In the context of this paper, we are only interested
in the following four:
• Name – A URI-compliant sequence of name components.
• Payload – The actual data of the content object.
• Validation – A composite of validation algorithm
information (e.g., the signature algorithm used, its pa-
rameters, and a link to the public verification key), and
validation payload (e.g., the signature). For simplicity, we
use the term “signature” to refer to this field.
• ExpiryTime – Producer-recommended time for the
content objects to be cached.
There are three types of CCN entities or roles:4
• Consumer – an entity that issues an interest for content.
• Producer – an entity that produces and publishes content.
• Router (Forwarder) – an entity that routes interest packets
and forwards corresponding content packets.
Each CCN entity maintains three structures [4]:
• Content Store (CS) – a cache used for content caching and
retrieval. Cache size is determined by local resource avail-
ability. Each router may unilaterally determine whether to
cache content and for how long. From here on, we use
the terms CS and cache interchangeably.
• Forwarding Interest Base (FIB) – a table of name prefixes
and corresponding outgoing interfaces. The FIB is used to
route interests based on longest-prefix-match of the name.
• Pending Interest Table (PIT) – a table of outstanding
(pending) interests and a set of corresponding incoming
interfaces.5
2We use the terms content and content object interchangeably.
3Currently, NDN interest messages do not provide an arbitrary-length
payload and therefore cannot support some of the proposed accounting types,
as will become clear later in the paper. However, if in the future the NDN
interest format includes a field similar to the CCNx payload, our accounting
approach will become applicable.
4A physical entity (a host, in today’s parlance) can be both consumer and
producer of content.
5A given PIT entry might indicate multiple incoming interfaces reflecting
the possibility of multiple interests arriving at, or near, the same time.
Upon receiving an interest with the name N (i.e., for the
content with name N ), a router first checks its cache for
existence of a local copy of content with the same name.6
If a local copy is not found in the cache, and there are no
pending interests for N , the router forwards the interest to
the next hop(s) according to its FIB and forwarding strategy.
For each forwarded interest, a router creates a new PIT entry
with state information, including the name and the interface
on which it arrived. Moreover, if an interest with the name
N arrives while there is already an entry for the same name
in the PIT, the router collapses the present interest and only
stores the interface on which it was received. When content is
returned, the router forwards it out on all recorded incoming
interfaces and flushes the corresponding PIT entry. Since no
additional information is needed to deliver content, an interest
does not carry a source address.
III. ACCOUNTING IN CCN
As mentioned earlier, router caches present a major chal-
lenge for accounting in CCN. In particular, if interests are
satisfied by caches, how can a content producer collect
information about the popularity of (or demand for)
its content? In this section, we discuss design elements for
accounting in CCN. For the time being, we do not emphasize
security and privacy considerations. Specifically, assuming
benign (well-behaved) consumers, routers, and producers, our
initial goal is to determine the minimal functionality needed
by all CCN entities to facilitate correct accounting. In doing
so, we consider three types of accounting information:
• Individual: This type of information is tied directly to a
specific consumer. An example might be the number of
times a particular consumer requested a particular content.
It provides linkability between consumers and content
they obtain. Moreover, it requires revealing consumer
identities, at least to the producer.
• Distinct: This type of information is functionally equiva-
lent to the individual accounting information with the ex-
ception that consumer identities are not revealed. Instead,
a randomly generated nonce is added to the each interest
to enable a producer to distinguish between separate
interests. More details are explained in the following
sections.
• Aggregate: This type of information represents an ag-
gregate over a set of consumers. For example, it might
include the number of times a particular piece of content
was requested from a specific geographic location or
an ISP. Aggregate information enables some degree of
consumer privacy.
We believe that these three types are sufficiently representative
of any accounting information needed in any real-world CCN
application and focus on them in the remainder of this work.
Also, we claim that accounting should not be mandatory for all
content. Some producers might not care about the popularity
of any of their content, while others might need accounting
information only for some of their content. We refer to content
for which producers desire such information as accountable
content.
6This is why CCN lacks any notion of a destination address; since content
can be served by any CCN entity.
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Lastly, one important design dimension is whether account-
ing information is reported in real time (online) or not (offline).
In the latter case, a network management protocol can be
envisaged whereby an AS-level accounting server periodically
collects cache hit logs from its routers and reports the results
to individual producers or AS-housing producers. This kind
of accounting seems viable. However, it involves a potentially
significant delay in notifying producers about the demand, or
lack thereof, for their content. This might be unacceptable for
content for which real time demand information is needed.
Intuitively, real-time accounting is a more difficult problem to
solve. We therefore limit the rest of this paper to real-time
accounting.
A. Counting Cache Hits vs. Content Requests
Another variable in supporting CCN accounting is exactly
what is being counted: instances of cache hits, or instances
of requested content being served to the consumer? A cache
hit occurs when a router or another entity finds the requested
content in its cache. By another entity we mean either a
producer or a repository that keeps a copy of the content.
We assume that accounting for cache hits is only relevant for
routers, i.e., network elements.7 An instance of content being
served occurs when a cache hit takes place and the content is
actually delivered to a single consumer.
It might seem that these two types of events are the same,
i.e., a content is served once for every cache hit, and vice-
versa. However, this is not the case in CCN. Whenever a router
receives an interest, it may choose to multicast (forward) it out
on multiple interfaces. This behavior is officially allowed since
a router’s FIB can express multiple next hops for a given name
prefix. One practical reason for allowing it that it facilitates
quick(er) fetching of content. However, it also complicates
accounting. Consider the following scenario:
Suppose that a consumer requests content CO and
the issued interest is received by router R1. The
latter then forwards the interest for CO to two
upstream routers R2 and R3 based on its FIB. Both
R2 and R3 have CO in their respective caches
and each replies to R1 with its cached version.
Assuming that R2’s copy of CO is the first to reach
R1, the latter forwards CO downstream and flushes
the appropriate PIT entry. When R3’s copy of CO
arrives, R1 discards it since it does not refer to a
current existing PIT entry. If both R2 and R3 inform
CO’s producer P about a cache hit on CO, P would
incorrectly assume that CO was requested twice.
Even though, technically, CO is served twice by
two distinct routers, there was only one requesting
consumer which received only one copy of CO.
According to this scenario, the count of cache hits can exceed
the content request count. This problem occurs because there
is no way to distinguish among different interests issued for
the same content.8 In other words, if consumers Cr1 and Cr2
7Accounting for cache hits in repositories or at producers themselves is out
of scope.
8NDN interests carry a random nonce used for interest loop detection,
which can be helpful in this distinction. However, CCNx interests do not
carry nonces.
issue interests for COvat different times, their interests would
be identical. Moreover, even if CO is not cached, i.e., interests
for it reach P , and if Cr1 and Cr2 issue interests for CO
at roughly the same time, P would be unable to distinguish
between this case – when two consumers ask for CO – and
the case in the scenario above – when one consumer asking
for CO and R1 decides to multicast the interest upstream.
Note that the number of cache hits is equal to two in both
cases, but the number of content objects served is two and
one, respectively.
The reason for supporting both types of accounting is quite
intuitive: a producer might need to know the exact demand
for its content, whether on an aggregate or individual basis.
Separately, a producer might need to know which routers
experience cache hits for its content. The latter could be used
to reconcile billing the producer for cache usage.
Finally, even though accounting for cache hits and content
requests is not the same thing, we naturally would like to use
the same mechanism as much as possible to provide both.
Therefore, for the rest of the paper and unless otherwise
mentioned, we use the term accounting to refer to both
accounting for cache hits and content requests.
B. Accounting via Content Encryption
One intuitive accounting approach is to use encrypted con-
tent.9 Suppose that producers encrypt all accountable content,
and the decryption keys – which, in CCN, are represented as
content objects with well-defined names – are configured not
to be cached, i.e., by setting their ExpiryTime to 0. Even if
consumer interests requesting such content are satisfied from
in-network caches, the former must separately issue interests
requesting the decryption key(s). Such interests bypass in-
network caches and reach the producers, thereby enabling per-
request accounting.
With content encryption, the desired type of accounting
dictates how interests requesting keys should be generated.
In the case of individual accounting, consumers must include
some kind of consumer-specific data in the interests when keys
are requested. Such data allows producers to link these interests
to specific consumers. However, if only aggregate accounting
is required, interests requesting keys do not have to carry any
consumer-specific data. As mentioned above, such interests
need to have some kind of a nonce to enable the producer to
distinguish between the case of receiving two interests from
two different consumers, or receiving two interests sent from
a single consumer and were multicasted by a router in the
network.
Accounting via content encryption has two primary ad-
vantages: (1) it is transparent to the network layer, and (2)
it does not require any new features and message types.
However, despite its apparent simplicity, it is not efficient. All
accountable content objects need to be encrypted and keys
need to be requested and distributed separately. Thus, content
is obtained by issuing two interests – one for the content and
one for the key(s) – thus incurring at least two round-trips to
the producer.
9This is also a form of access control.
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We believe that an ideal accounting mechanism should
efficiently work for all accountable content. That is, it should
not require a consumer to issue more than a single interest for
accountable content. Also, general content accounting should
be distinct from content access control.
C. Accounting via Push Interests
The accounting approach proposed in this paper is based
on real-time reporting. The key element is a new message
type that we call a push interest, denoted as pInt. Its main
purpose is to inform the producer that its content has been
requested and a cache hit occurred. Structurally, a pInt carries a
name similar to a regular interest. However, the most important
distinguishing feature of a pInt, is that, unlike a regular interest,
it does not leave behind any state in routers. Specifically, a
pInt referencing content CO is forwarded by each router until
it reaches its corresponding producer P , and no information
about that pInt is retained by any intervening router. A router
forwards a pInt just like it forwards a regular interest with
the exception that pInt messages are not multicasted. This
restriction is necessary to prevent producers from receiving
duplicate copies of the same pInt.
Besides this forwarding change, the behavior of CCN
routers is slightly modified to support pInt generation. There
are two cases when a router generates a pInt:
1) Whenever a regular interest with name N is satisfied from
its cache, a router generates a pInt with the same name
N and forwards it upstream towards the producer.
2) When a router receives a content object corresponding to a
PIT entry, it forwards that message on all downstream in-
terfaces listed in said PIT entry. However, before flushing
that entry, a router generates a pInt that aggregates all col-
lapsed interests. (These aggregation details are discussed
in Section III-D.) Note that collapsed refers only to those
interests that were not originally forwarded upstream.
This is because the one forwarded upstream presumably
already (1) reached the producer, or (2) triggered its own
pInt via case 1 above.10
In order for a producer to inform routers about what content
requires accounting, we also introduce a new ACCT flag in the
content header, which reflects one the following three values:
1) NONE: the producer requests no accounting information
for this content.
2) AGGREGATE: the producer requests aggregate accounting
information for this content.
3) DISTINCT: the producer requests distinct accounting
information for this content.
4) INDIVIDUAL: the producer requires individual interest-
level accounting for this content.
Whenever a cache hit occurs, routers behave the same for cases
2, 3, and 4. The only difference is when a content arrives and a
router has a number of previously collapsed interests for that
content. In case 2, a router generates a pInt with the count
10For example, suppose that a router receives an interest for content CO
on interfaces: 2, 3, 5, and 6. Regularly, only the first one (arriving on interface
2) is forwarded, say, on interface 9. Interests on 3, 5 and 6 arrive later and are
collapsed in the same PIT entry. Now, when CO arrives back on interface 9,
it is forwarded out on all 4 incoming interfaces. However, the router generates
a pInt that reflects only the last 3 interfaces: 3, 5 and 6.
of collapsed interests for a given content. In cases 3 and 4,
a router reports the actual interests, which can optionally be
bundled into a single pInt.
As hinted in the above discussion, we aim to support
aggregate, distinct, and individual accounting types, and to
report instances of cache hits as well as instances of content
requests. Distinct and individual accounting for cache hits and
content requests (as well as aggregate for cache hits) is possible
and indeed attained by the proposed technique. Unfortunately,
as will become clear below, supporting accurate distinct and
aggregate accounting for content requests is quite challenging.
However, if some kind of consumer-specific data is provided
in interest Payload fields, probabilistically accurate distinct
and aggregate accounting for content requests can be achieved.
D. pInt Format and Features
We now describe the pInt message format and discuss the
purpose of its fields. Structurally, this message is nearly iso-
morphic to CCNx 1.0 interests [5], and includes the following
necessary fields:
• Name: copied entirely from the Name field in the interest
(or PIT entry) that triggers a pInt.
• Type: flag indicating whether this pInt is for aggregate,
distinct, or individual accounting.
• Origin: identifies the router that generates the pInt, e.g.,
the router’s prefix (if available) or public key digest.
• Count: set to 1 in the case of a cache hit, or the number
of interfaces minus one on which the content object was
forwarded downstream if interest collapsing occurred.
• Cdata: a random nonce or consumer-specific data used
by producer for different purposes based on the ac-
counting type required (i.e., distinct or individual). If
Count> 1, this is a sequence of Count of consumer-
specific data culled from corresponding interests. Such
data can be carried in the interest Payload field.
The semantics of the Cdata field depend on the type of
required accounting information. As stated above, aggregate
accounting for cache hits does not require Cdata to be
present. In the following we discuss consumer-specific data
requirements for other accounting types.
Aggregate accounting for content requests: The problem in
this type of accounting is that producers do not have the means
to distinguish between the cases where received interests (or
pInt messages) with the same name are multicasted by routers
or generated by several distinct consumers. However, if con-
sumers include random nonces and timestamps as consumer-
specific data, this distinction can be achieved.
Individual Accounting for cache hits and content requests:
In this case, Cdata needs to reflect the identify of consumers
issuing interests. This value can take a variety of forms:
1) Consumer public keys or their digests. Note that this form
reveals consumer identities to all network entities – not
only producers.
2) Group public keys or their digests. A group can be an
organization, autonomous system (AS), or a geographical
region. In this case, the group identify is revealed rather
than that of the individual consumer.
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3) Unique consumer identifiers (i.e., pseudonyms). Although
this does not violate consumer anonymity, such identifiers
need to be assigned to consumers by producers or a
trusted third party before any interests are issued. Note
that this form of Cdata allows interest linkability.11
4) Consumer identity (using any of the three previous forms)
with nonces and timestamps. This form of consumer-
specific data allows producers to know which consumers
request what content, as well as how many times such
requests are made.
Distinct Accounting for cache hits and content requests: For
this accounting type, Cdata needs to reflect the uniqueness of
interests. This can be achieved if consumers include a nonce
and timestamp in the Cdata field. The format of the nonce is
application-specific and can range from a random number to
the hash of the content name and the timestamp.
Note that the same knowledge provided to the producer in the
distinct accounting case can also be attained using aggregate
accounting type if Cdata reflects the uniqueness of interests.
However, we keep the distinction between these two types for
ease of classification.
Each of the above forms impose different overhead on
consumers and producers. However, router overhead is only
very slightly affected if accounting is done with pInt mes-
sages.12 This is because routers simply populate the Cdata
field of generated pInt messages using information contained in
the Payload field of the corresponding interests, regardless
of how consumer-specific data is generated. In other words,
routers are oblivious to the accounting type used.
Also, note that the choice of which form to use is an
application-specific issue. We do not mandate a specific tech-
nique.
E. Correctness
We define correctness of an accounting technique as fol-
lows.
Definition 1. An accounting technique is correct if it accu-
rately reports cache hit and content request information to the
producer, assuming that all participants faithfully follow the
rules (i.e., exhibit no malicious behavior) and there are no
transmission errors, packet loss, or node failures that affect
accounting-relevant traffic.
We also define probabilistically correct accounting tech-
nique as follows.
Definition 2. An accounting technique is probabilistically
correct if it is correct with a negligible probability of error,
i.e., reporting inaccurate or false information.
We now informally prove correctness of each of the pro-
posed accounting techniques: individual, distinct, and aggre-
gate in both cache hits and content requests cases.
Cache Hits: A router R generates pInt messages for producer
P for every cache hit on accountable content objects. Since all
11Interest linkability is defined as the ability of an eavesdropper (observer
or adversary) to reveal that fact whether two captured interests are issued by
the same consumer.
12 Content encryption-based accounting is completely transparent to routers.
routers (including R) on the path to P forward pInt messages
according to their FIB entries, such messages are guaranteed
to be received by P .13 This provides accurate cache hit counts
for content objects in question. This argument holds for all
three types of accounting. The only difference is that Cdata
fields of pInt must contain appropriate consumer-specific data
in some accounting types.
Content Requests: Recall that pInt messages are also gener-
ated to report collapsed interests. Such interests reflect content
requests in the network. Although pInt messages provide
correct individual, distinct, and aggregate accounting for cache
hits, it can only provide probabilistically correct accounting
for content requests. As stated above, consumers can include
nonces and timestamps in the Payload fields of their in-
terests. If producers post-process received pInt messages, this
Payload information allows them to distinguish between the
cases where received interests (or pInt messages) with the same
name are multicast by routers or generated by several distinct
consumers. However, since nonces are random strings of bits,
collisions might occur with a probability negligible in their bit
length.
F. Performance
As previously mentioned, our goal is to design a
lightweight mechanism for secure accounting in CCN. In this
section we discuss involvement of consumers, routers and
producers.
Consumers: The degree of consumer overhead varies depend-
ing on the accounting type required. In the case of aggregate
accounting for cache hits, pInt-based accounting is transparent
to the consumers. However, when aggregate accounting for
content requests is required, distinct or individual accounting
techniques must be used. In this case, consumers must in-
clude a random nonce or consumer-specific data in all issued
interests as described in Section III-C.14 The overhead for
consumers depends on how this data is generated. For instance,
consumer-specific data resilient to some types of attacks can
increase this overhead – see Section IV-B for details.
Routers: Regardless of the accounting type used, router in-
volvement is always required when pInt messages are used.15
For all accountable content, routers must generate pInt mes-
sages whenever cache hits occur or collapsed interests are
satisfied. However, we argue that routers overhead is minimal.
To enable efficient throughput, a router must be able to
quickly construct pInt messages in the fast path. All pInt field
values can be copied from their corresponding counterparts in
interest and content headers. For instance, the Name and Type
values can be copied from the corresponding content header
fields Name and ACCT. The Cdata field can be populated by
copying Payload field values from corresponding interests.
Moreover, the router identifier in the Origin field can be
pre-computed (if needed) and stored in memory.
Algorithm 1 illustrates a procedure to generate pInt mes-
sages in routers. It is triggered whenever a router receives a
13Recall that we assume there are no transmission errors or packet loss
events.
14Human consumers are not involved, only their applications.
15Content encryption-based accounting is transparent to routers.
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TABLE I. CCN ENTITIES OVERHEAD IN ACCOUNTING. N/A ALSO INDICATES THAT NO INVOLVEMENT IS REQUIRED.
Consumers Routers Producers
Accounting Type Aggregate Individual Aggregate Individual Aggregate Individual
Cache hits N/A consumer-specific pInt messagesgeneration O(|CP |) O(|UP | · |CP |) counters &Content requests nonces/timestamps data generation counters consumer-specific data sanitation
Algorithm 1 pInt-Generation
1: Input: CO[N, ACCT], Int[N,PL], Rid
2: pInt.Name := CO.N
3: pInt.Type := CO.ACCT
4: pInt.Origin := Rid
5: if CO from local cache then
6: pInt.Cdata := Int.PL
7: pInt.Count := 1
8: else
9: e = FindPITEntry(CO.N )
10: for each i in e/{Int} do
11: pInt.Cdata := pInt.Cdata || i.PL
12: pInt.Count := pInt.Count + 1
13: end for
14: end if
15: Forward pInt according to the FIB
solicited content object or locates a copy in its local cache.
The algorithm takes as input the received content object CO
with name N and accounting flag ACCT, its corresponding
interest Int with name N and payload PL, and the router Rid.
If CO is not in local cache, the router (1) copies consumer-
specific data from all interests in the corresponding PIT entry
into Cdata, and (2) sets Count value accordingly.
To obtain better better bandwidth utilization, routers can
generate a single pInt message for a specific content CO in a
pre-defined time window. In this case, routers report batched
cache hits by (1) including the actual cache hit counters in the
pInt’s Count field, and (2) listing all consumer-specific data
from the corresponding interests (if any) in the pInt’s Cdata
field.
Producer: Similar to routers, producers requesting accounting
information are always involved and the overhead varies de-
pending on the type of accounting required. We describe these
differences below.
• Aggregate: the overhead is minimal in this case. Pro-
ducers only need to maintain a cache hit counter for
every accountable content they publish. The counters
maintained at producer P are in order O(|CP |), where
CP is the set of accountable content published by P .
• Individual: producers have to maintain a counter for every
{consumer, accountable content} pair. The size of the
counters table is in order O(|UP | · |CP |), where UP
is the set of consumers requesting accountable content
from P . The producer might also store the timestamp
at which requests for content arrived. This, obviously,
storage requirements. Moreover, to provide correct indi-
vidual accounting for content requests, producers must
post-process all received pInt messages in order to detect
duplicates caused by interest multicasting by routers.
• Distinct: in this case, producers have to maintain a
counter for every accountable content object as well as
information about all requests for these objects. Such
information could be the timestamp at which requests are
received, as discussed in Section III-C. The size of the
stored information is in order O(|RP |+ |CP |), where RP
is the set of all requests received by P for its published
accountable content.
Table I summarizes each CCN entity overhead in the proposed
accounting mechanisms.
IV. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Thus far, we assumed that all entities involved in account-
ing are benign, i.e., act honestly and correctly. However, this
assumption is clearly unrealistic in practice. In this section, we
propose security requirements to achieve secure accounting in
CCN. We also show that some attacks cannot be prevented
or even detected without additional cryptographic overhead.
Moreover, we stress that implementing secure accounting
incurs a trade-off between security and overhead on consumers
and producers. Fortunately, routers are unaffected by such
amendments.
A. Adversary Model
The anticipated adversary Adv is a malicious router gener-
ating pInt messages for non-existing interests, when individual
accounting is required. In other words, Adv tries to inflate indi-
vidual accounting information for both cache hits and content
requests. We also assume that consumers behave honestly: if a
consumer needs to provide consumer-specific data or a random
nonce, it does so correctly. We consider dishonest consumers
later in Section V.
For completeness, we identify the following additional
attacks and show why we exclude them from the discussion.
• A router that (1) does not generate pInt messages when
necessary, or (2) generates pInt messages without for-
warding content downstream. Both cases can be reduced
to packet loss events. We do not address these attacks
since the router’s malicious behavior cannot be detected.
• A consumer that continuously generates interests to inflate
accounting information. If aggregate or distinct account-
ing is required, the producer will not be able to detect
such malicious behavior.
On the other hand, if individual accounting is required,
consumer-specific data can be used to detect continuous
requests. However, this scenario can be reduced to an
Interest Flooding (IF) attack [6], [7], which is outside
the scope of this paper. A similar argument applies for
distinct accounting information.
• An external attacker that controls network links, that
is capable of eavesdropping on, dropping, or replaying
packets, including pInt messages. This attack is irrelevant
if links are encrypted, which is a realistic assumption for
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adjacent routers. In most cases, consumers and producers
are connected to edge routers using link-layer encryption,
e.g., EAP [8].
Again, we do not consider an adversary that tries to inflate
aggregate or distinct accounting information. As previously
argued, this cannot be prevented deterministically due to the
likely usage of multicast forwarding strategies. Therefore,
we only consider security of correct individual accounting
information. More formally, we define a secure accounting
technique as follows.
Definition 3. An accounting technique is secure with respect
to Adv if it is correct and all Adv malicious behavior can be
detected.
B. Mitigating Forgeries and Replay Attacks
Section III-C mentioned several options for generating
consumer-specific data. However, in order to prevent inflation
attacks, such data must be unforgeable and resistant to replay
attacks. We define secure consumer-specific data as follows.
Definition 4. Consumer specific data is secure if it can be
authenticated by at least the producer, and is neither forgeable
nor subject to replay attacks.
Providing replay resiliency can be accomplished if
consumer-specific data carries a nonce r and a timestamp t.
If producers receive consumer-specific data with duplicate r
in the same time window to which t belongs, such data is
discarded. Using these values, secure consumer-specific data
Sec-CrSD takes the following form.
Sec-CrSD =
[
CrSD||r||t,
fk (CrSD||r||t||Int.N)
]
(1)
where CrSD is consumer-specific data formed according to
Section III-D16, fk(·) is a function that provide unforgeability,
and k is a secret key (either symmetric or private key.) Note
that interest name in the fk(·) computation is used to bind
Sec-CrSD to the interest to which it is appended. This prevents
Adv from using the same Sec-CrSD for generating multiple
pInt messages with different names. The function fk(·) can be a
Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [9] (if consumers
share secrets with producers) or a digital signature generation
function. Each method has well-known advantages and draw-
backs. Symmetric HMAC-based functions are generally much
less costly than digital signatures. However, the former requires
a priori key distribution. On the other hand, using digital
signatures involves in-line distribution and on-line verification
of signers’ public keys. This method of generating Sec-CrSD
incurs a lot of computational and storage overhead. In addition
to signature verification, producers are required to maintain
a list of all received nonces in the acceptable current time
window for each accountable content.
At this point, it becomes clear that unforgeability and
replay resiliency cannot be achieved unless secure consumer-
specific data is used. This is not possible if aggregate or distinct
16Note that CrSD and Cdata are different. The former is generated by
consumers and assigned to Payload field of interest, while the latter is a
field in a pInt and may contain none or many CrSD-s.
accounting is required, where consumer-specific data is not
provided. One way to solve the problem is to include Sec-CrSD
in all interests regardless of the accounting type required. This
is impractical as it introduces unnecessary overhead for both
consumers and producers.
C. Preserving Consumer Anonymity
In order to provide secure individual accounting in the
presence of Adv, consumer-specific data should be generated
securely. Digital signatures, by nature, reveal the consumer’s
identity, and HMAC tags allow separate interests to be linked
together since a key identifier must be included in the interest
to properly verify each HMAC. To this end, we develop a
technique for generating Sec-CrSD anonymous to all network
entities, except producers.
We begin with the notion of consumer-specific data in-
distinguishability, which is necessary to maintain anonymity
among an arbitrary set of consumers.
Definition 5. Let Cra and Crb be two consumers generating
two consumer-specific data values CrSDa and CrSDb in two
different interests for the same content object CO. Let E be
any eavesdropper (except the producer publishing CO) and
not directly connected to either Cra or Crb. Let the event
of E successfully revealing the source of CrSDa and CrSDb
be denoted as Erev
(
CrSDa,CrSDb
)
= 1. We claim that
these two interests are indistinguishable if the probability of
Erev
(
CrSDa,CrSDb
)
= 1 is no better than a random guess.
That is,
Pr
[
Erev
(
CrSDa,CrSDb
)
= 1
]
≤ 1
2
+ (n),
for any negligible function  and security parameter n.
Moreover, we assume that consumers know the producer’s
public key pk before requesting its content; see Section V
for justification. Let A-CrSD denote an anonymous consumer-
specific data of the form:
A-CrSD = Encpk (Sec-CrSD) (2)
where Encpk(·) is a public key encryption function using pk,
and Sec-CrSD is formed according to Equation 1.
To prevent E from learning that two interests are generated
by the same consumer, A-CrSD values in the two interests
should be indistinguishable. This can only be achieved if
Encpk(·) is a CPA-secure public key encryption scheme, i.e.,
secure against Chosen Plaintext Attacks [10]. In some encryp-
tion schemes, this is done by mixing in a random number
(nonce) with the plaintext before encryption.
Theorem 1. Assume a CPA-secure public key encryption
scheme Encpk(·). An A-CrSD composed according to Equa-
tion 2 guarantees indistinguishable consumer-specific data
with a negligible probability of nonce collision.
Proof: The proof of consumer-specific data indistin-
guishability follows from the proof of CPA-secure public
key encryption scheme [10]. We only prove that A-CrSD
generation guarantees negligible probability of nonce collision.
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We assume individual accounting, and that f is the fre-
quency in which consumers send interests to a specific pro-
ducer during a specific time window w, where each con-
sumer generates appropriate A-CrSD values in the interests.
Let the number of interests sent be s = f × w. We
claim that the probability of any two A-CrSD-s in the set
{A-CrSD1, . . . ,A-CrSDs} being derived from colliding nonces
is negligible in N , the length of the nonce in bits. Let
this collision event be denoted as Col(A-CrSDi,A-CrSDj) for
i 6= j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ s. The probability of this event occurring
can be calculated according to the birthday paradox as follows.
Pr
[
Col(A-CrSDi,A-CrSDj) = 1 ; i 6= j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ r
]
= 1−
(
2N
2N
× 2
N − 1
2N
× · · · × 2
N − s+ 1
2N
)
= 1− 2
N !
(2N )
s
(2N − s)!
= 1− s! ·
(
2N
s
)
(2N )
s (3)
Note that Equation 3 assumes that s < 2N ; otherwise, the
collision probability is equal to 1 according to the Pigeonhole
Principle.
We note that public-key operations to generate and verify
A-CrSD values may be overly expensive for some consumers.
In such scenarios, a potential optimization is to use symmetric
encryption. Specifically, A-CrSD values can be computed as
enck(Sec-CrSD), where enck(·) is a CPA-secure symmetric
encryption function and k is a shared secret between the
consumer and the producer. This, however, requires additional
operations for creating and managing shared secrets. In order
for producers to determine which shared secret to use for
decrypting received A-CrSD-s, consumers should add a form of
cleartext identifier, e.g., shared key tag. Although this violates
interests indistinguishability, it does indeed preserve consumer
anonymity.
V. INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTING IN PRACTICE
In this section we describe some challenges related to
transparently collecting individual accounting information. We
then outline recommendations for applications wishing to
implement accounting in CCN.
A. Individual Accounting Challenges
Thus far, we made several assumptions about consumers
as far as individual accounting information conveyed to pro-
ducers:
1) Consumers know what accounting information is needed
for a desired content object.
2) Consumers know the producer’s public key pk used to
encrypt Sec-CrSD sections.
3) Consumers behave honestly, i.e., for content that re-
quires individual accounting information in the CrSD,
consumers supply correct required information.
The first assumption seems to be particularly problematic,
especially if a given consumer has no prior relationship with a
specific producer. However, there are at least two simple ways
for consumers to learn what a producer expects in an interest.
First, recall that adherence to sound trust management at
the network layer [11] requires the consumer to know, when
requesting content (issuing an interest), the public key of
the producer. This, in turn, means that the consumer pre-
fetched the producer’s public key. It is easy to extend the
producer’s public key certificate to include desired accounting
requirements for constructing correct interests for that producer
and the namespace included in the certificate.
One natural alternative is for consumer to “blindly” issue
a trial interest for some random content in the namespace of a
given producer. This interest might not abide by the producer’s
accounting rules. However, the producer could then reply with
its public key certificate that would include the producer’s
accounting requirements.
Without performing one of the aforementioned techniques,
a consumer cannot be expected to provide specific information
in an interest since it does not have any expectation of the form
of this information. We consider possible consumer behavior
for each accounting type below.
• Aggregate: For this type of accounting information, the
CrSD fields are empty and pInt messages only contain a
count. Thus, consumers are not required to have any a
priori information when constructing their original inter-
est.
• Distinct: CrSD contains random nonces for each interest
issued, and pInt messages carry collections of these
nonces from consumers to producers along with a total
count. The nonce does not require any application-specific
input from the consumer to generate; it is simply a random
string. Thus, in this case, consumers are also not required
to have any a priori information.
• Individual: For this type of accounting information, CrSD
contains a very specific piece of consumer-specific data
(identifier) for each interest, and pInt messages propagate
these values to producers. To be useful for individual
accounting, producers must be able to utilize the provided
information in order to identify each consumer. Further-
more, it will likely be the case that different producers
require different identification information, both in its
content and representation. Thus, consumers cannot be
expected to know which type of consumer-specific data
to provide in an interest without having been told before-
hand.
It is clear that individual accounting information necessitates
some initial interaction or registration phase, wherein con-
sumers are given the interest CrSD requirements and also the
public key used when generating Sec-CrSD or A-CrSD values
in interests. Note that the issue of public key identification
is analogous to the problem of not knowing what consumer-
specific data to use for a given interest.
This interaction or registration step covers assumptions (1)
and (2) above, but it does not address assumption (3). Namely,
even if a consumer has all of the information at their disposal
needed to construct a valid interest for a given content object,
what happens if they maliciously choose to use the wrong
information? Such an adversary can easily obtain data from
router caches without having to provide the correct accounting
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information to the producer, thereby effectively bypassing the
accounting mechanism.
The core problem is that routers have no means to de-
termine if the information contained in interest CrSD fields
is correct17 for a given content object. To be able to verify
this information routers would have to possess (or be told)
some piece of information for each cached content that requires
individual accounting. Only then can routers verify CrSD field
values before replying with a cached content. Not only is
this unreasonable for routers, it also means that anonymous
consumer-specific data, as described in Section IV-C, is no
longer feasible. Since routers must be able to verify the CrSD
for each interest associated, the consumer must necessarily
reveal some information about their identity.
Therefore, we claim that assumption (3) is not realistic
at the network-layer in the presence of caches and dishonest
consumers. This means that individual accounting must be
handled at the application layer. The proof of this claim can
be argued from the above discussion.
B. Recommendations
Given the previous discussion, we present some recom-
mendations for collecting accounting information in CCN.
First, if individual accounting information is needed, producers
must simply set all content cache time to zero (0). This will
force all interests to be routed to the producer without being
satisfied from an in-network cache. If an interest for content
that requires individual accounting is received and the required
accounting information is missing, producers should reply
with a Negative Acknowledgment (NACK) [12] indicating
consumer-specific data requirements to obtain said content.
The consumer can then re-issue an interest with the correct
information. If consumers go through a preliminary registration
step, this accounting requirement information can be obtained
once and then used for all subsequent interests, thereby re-
moving the need for an additional round-trip. Observe that
since producers process all interests before responding with
content, they can determine if a given interest for individual
accountable content is valid and thus detect behavior by
malicious dishonest consumer.
For aggregate and distinct accountable content, consumers
should always generate a random nonce and include it in
CrSD. If a router caches the content and its ACCT flag is
AGGREGATE, then CrSD values can simply be dropped when
pInt messages are generated. Otherwise, if the router caches the
content and its ACCT flag is DISTINCT, the nonce is copied
into the generated pInt. This is a simple modification to the
router pInt generation procedure described in Algorithm 1, and
induces no significant overhead for consumers or routers.
This simple policy can be extended to all interests. Since
consumers are not generally expected to know what type of
accounting information is required for content, they can blindly
generate a nonce for each interest they issue. CCN routers will
then correctly propagate these nonces in pInt messages to the
producer according to the rule above. As previously noted,
NDN already supports default nonce generation in interests
17This means that the provided information is the one required by the
producer.
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Fig. 1. Network overhead imposed by forwarding pInt messages.
(but for the purposes of interest loop detection). The CCNx
protocol needs to be updated to include this requirement.
VI. ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL ASSESSMENT
In Section III, we proposed two fundamental techniques for
propagating accounting information to producers: encryption-
based and pInt-based solutions. The former technique is benefi-
cial in that it is entirely transparent to the routers. Encryption-
based accounting, which is a form of access control, is an
application-layer concern, and therefore the routers do not
require any modification to support the scheme. Conversely,
accounting based on pInt messages requires routers to execute
the pInt-Generation procedure upon every cache hit to gen-
erate pInt messages, and also forward pInt messages towards
producers using the same data plane logic as normal interest
messages.
Consider a scenario in which we have k consumers
Cr1, . . . , Crk and a single producer P . Let Cri, R1, . . . , Rl, P
be a consumer-to-producer path traversed by interests issued by
consumer Cri for the accountable content object CO. Let Rc,
1 ≤ c ≤ l be the router at which CO is cached. Furthermore,
let pl be the number of messages traversing the R1 − Rc
path in one direction, and let pr be the number of messages
traversing the Rc − P path in one direction. Finally, let γ be
the number of content requests issued by all consumers Cri,
i = 1, . . . , k, along the R1 − P path. Recall that encryption-
based accounting requires consumers to issue at least two (2)
interests to access accountable content: one interest is issued
for the content itself, and then at least one more is issued to
request the corresponding decryption keys. The former interest
will traverse the R1 − Rc path, whereas all decryption key
interests will traverse the full R1−P path. Thus, in this case,
pl = 4γ and pr = 2γ. Conversely, in the pInt-based approach,
a single interest is issued for CO on the Cr − Rc path, and
then a pInt is generated at Rc and forwarded along the Rc−P
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(a) Path topology with 5 nodes (1 consumer, 3 routers, and 1 producer),
A = 500 and M = 1000.
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(b) Path topology with 5 nodes (1 consumer, 3 routers, and 1 producer),
A = 500 and M = 10.
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(c) Binary tree of height 5 (32 consumers, 30 routers, and 1 producer),
A = 500 and M = 1000.
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(d) Binary tree of height 5 (32 consumers, 30 routers, and 1 producer),
A = 500 and M = 10.
Fig. 2. pInt-based accounting overhead in networks with path and tree topologies.
path. Therefore, in this case, pl = 2γ and pr = γ. Note that
the case where Rc = P is identical to the scenario where
there are no in-network caches, in which case there would be
no pInt messages generated. This case performs worse than
the pInt-based variant since pl = 2γ and pr = 2γ (there is a
single RTT from the Cri to P for CO).
Notice that the differences in pl are due to the fact that,
unlike interests, pInt messages have no response from the
producer. In fact, the network overhead, in terms of the number
of messages, of the encryption-based accounting solution is
exactly twice that of the pInt-based solution, and the network
overhead of the cacheless variant (which, again, invalidates the
need for pInt messages and accounting information) is more
than the pInt-based solution as well. Furthermore, producers,
and consumers incur additional overhead since encryption
and decryption must be performed, respectively, in order
to consume content. Therefore, in our initial experimental
assessment, we limit our focus to the pInt-based accounting
solution, since we feel that it is (a) a more efficient technique
and (b) also proportional to the overhead incurred by network
entities in the encryption-based scenario. In our experimental
analysis, we assume that adding the pInt generation procedure
is a constant time operation for routers. We also assume that
any shared-secret management protocols, such as those that
might be used to establish or acquire a shared HMAC key,
are done offline and are therefore not part of the real-time or
online communication.
If interests are satisfied from the cache of Rc, all upstream
routers on the consumer-to-producer path incur the overhead
of forwarding pInt messages to the producer. Figure 1 shows
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Fig. 4. DFN topology - pInt messages generation overhead at routers.
this overhead as a function of corresponding content size and
the number of links between the router generating pInt and the
producer. It is calculated as the the ratio of the extra bytes (due
to the forwarded pInt messages) traversing each link over the
size of the corresponding content object. The x-axis represents
content data size, without including the header. We calculated
the overhead in three line topologies containing 3, 4, and 5
nodes consisting of 2, 3, and 4 links respectively. The first
node is the consumer Cr and the last node is the producer P .
For the purpose of this exercise, we assume the following:
• Any content requested by Cr can always be satisfied by
the first hop (consumer facing) router’s (R) cache, i.e.,
cache hit rate is 100%. This accounts for the highest
network overhead since pInt must traverse all links except
the first one connecting Cr with R.
• Each router’s FIB is pre-configured to forward all interests
and pInt messages towards P .
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• Interest, pInt, and content object headers only contain a
name of length 40B.
The results from this experiment show that, as the size
of content objects grow, the bandwidth overhead induced by
pInt messages decreases. This overhead would increase if more
complex topologies were considered, e.g., k-ary trees rooted
at P . However, it would see the same decline as the content
object size increased.
A. Message Count Overhead
To further understand the performance impact of pInt-based
accounting in different topologies, we studied the amount of
overhead incurred by each entity – consumer, router, and
producer – in the network as a function of the distance from the
producer. To do this, we implemented a custom discrete-time
event-driven simulator that models a variety of CCN network
topologies: paths and binary trees. Consumers are configured
to issue interests for a single producer at a Poisson rate
with parameter A. The names of each interest are uniformly
sampled from a pool of M names. Each router invokes the
pInt-Generation procedure upon every cache hit. We place
no restriction on cache sizes, since the set of possible content
objects is small enough to fit within any reasonable sized
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cache. Specifically, producers respond to interests with content
objects with a fixed payload size of 1MB.
We argue that the number of messages is indicative of the
bandwidth overhead induced by pInt messages. This is because
the size of pInt messages will be proportional to the size of
interests, even with secure consumer-specific data. Therefore,
it is not the size of these messages that is important – it is the
sheer quantity which are processed by network elements. Thus,
we are concerned with the number of messages that propagate
from routers to the producer.
We study this overhead in networks with path and tree
topologies. For simplicity, we restrict our analysis to 5-hop
paths and binary trees of height 5. By varying A and M , we
show how many messages of each type are processed by each
entity as a function of the distance from the producer. Figure
2 illustrates the obtained results. Clearly, as M decreases,
the likelihood of cache hits increases. This results in a clear
increase in pInt processing at each upstream entity from the
cache hit location. For example, in the cases where M = 10,
approximately 99% of all messages processed by routers
upstream of cache locations were pInt messages.
The interest request rate is highly dependent on the type
of application. High request rates for popular content, which
is likely to be cached, will lead to a proportionally high
number of pInt messages propagating upstream to the producer.
If interests are issued for unpopular or uncached content,
then approximately the same number of interests will be
propagated upstream. In other words, from the perspective
of the producer, the sum of the received interests and pInt
messages will be equal the total number of content requests
from all consumers: the producer overhead is linear in the
number of content requests. The difference in these two cases
is that pInt messages are typically smaller in size than their
interest counterparts.
B. Router Overhead Assessment
To measure router overhead incurred by generating and for-
warding pInt messages we extended ndnSIM [13], a simplified
implementation of NDN architecture as a NS-3 [14] module
for simulation purposes, to support pInt messages. With this
modified architecture, we two sets of experiments using two
different topologies:
• The DFN network, Deutsches ForschungsNetz (German
Research Network) [15], [16]: a German network devel-
oped for research and education purposes which consists
of several connected routers positioned in different areas
of the country, as shown in Figure 3. The network consists
of a total of 30 routers. Blue dots in the figure represent
group of consumers connected to edge routers (red dots),
while green dots represent core network routers.
• The AT&T backbone network [7]: shown in Figure 5,
this network consists of more than 130 routers, and each
logical consumer in the figure represents multiple physical
consumers connected to an edge router.
In all of our experiments, consumers issue interests at a rate
of 10 interest per second for the same content with the name
/prefix/A/00. To capture the worst case scenario, wherein
the maximum number of pInt messages are generated, we (1)
disable interest collapsing, and (2) set the ExpiryTime of the
request content to be equal to the simulation time, ensuring that
this content is cached at routers throughout the whole duration
of the simulation. This forces routers to generate a single pInt
for every cache hit, resulting in the maximum amount of pInt
messages that can be possibly generated.
We measure the overhead required by routers to generate
and forward pInt messages as compared the the case where
pInt messages are not generated. Figure 4 shows the router
overhead in the DFN topology parameterized by the number of
consumers connected to edge routers (80, 160, 320, and 640).
We observed that even with 640 consumers in the network, the
overhead of an average router when generating pInt messages
is negligible. Similarly, Figure 6 shows the overhead of gen-
erating and forwarding pInt messages by routers in the AT&T
topology. In the case with 1280 consumers, routers experience
a 15% additional overhead while generating pInt messages,
which we consider to be negligible and a difference that can
be recovered with better routing hardware.
VII. RELATED WORK
Network-layer accounting in CCN and related interest-
based ICN architectures remains an open topic in the literature
[17]. However, certain economic aspects, such as how to set
and enforce prices, has been widely discussed [18], [19].
These results imply an application-layer strategy whereby
payment (not usage) information is willingly sent on behalf
of the consumer. This conflicts with the approach advocated
by Agyapong et al. [20], wherein only ISP-related entities (i.e.,
not consumers or producers) are involved in payment coordina-
tion. [20] considers producer payment as an application layer
concern. Our accounting techniques facilitates a blend between
these two schemes wherein usage and payment information
are sent autonomously on behalf of the network-layer for
consumers (end-hosts) and routers. ISP entities and producers
are informed of usage information for billing purposes, and
can follow up with payment collection at a later point in time.
Patane´ et al. [21] study a similar problem in the context
of IP-compatible architectures. Specifically, they focus on
ones with dedicated router caches like Content Distribution
Networks (CDNs) and transit networks that chauffeur traffic
between different ISP provider networks. Payment policies
proposed in [21] are identical, though. All parties pay for the
resources which were used to deliver their content. Patane´ et al.
also neglect to discuss means by which this payment and usage
information can be propagated. Similar to [19], Kocak et al.
[22] discuss methods where content providers can coordinate
price information and contracts between ISPs. Kocak et al.
also opt for an open, unfederated approach, which fits with our
model of autonomous accounting information propagation.
Another important element of this work is the generation
of secure consumer-specific data in pInt messages. There is
rich literature of packet-level authentication in the IP-based
Internet, much of which is contained in [23]. However, tech-
niques such as digital signatures and symmetric-key MACs
require some possibly unrealistic assumptions, such as shared
keys amongst all pairs of routers and trusted third parties
for key generation and management. Using improved public-
key cryptographic algorithms based on elliptic curves can
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help improve the signature scheme efficiency [24], as with
DNSCurve [25]. However, the sheer volume of interests in
CCN and related ICNs will very likely be substantially larger
than DNS queries in IP networks, leading to only relatively
modest improvements in performance.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper represents the first attempt to address accounting
in CCN. It presented a simple and lightweight accounting
technique and showed how to enhance it with security without
significant burden to consumers, producers, and routers. We
analyzed performance of the proposed technique and demon-
strated that secure accounting is both possible and practical in
CCN.
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